safety: permission policy DSL — allow/confirm/deny rule lists (closes #9)
The confirm_cmd boolean was too coarse: true interrupts every harmless
ls; false ungates everything. Most workflows want trust for read-only
ops while still gating writes/network/sudo.
New config:
permissions = {
allow = { "^ls%s", "^cat%s", "^git status" },
confirm = { "^rm%s", "^git push", "^docker%s", "^sudo%s" },
deny = { "^ssh%s+root@", "^curl%s+http[^s]" },
}
Verdict order: deny > confirm > allow. First match in the chosen
category wins. Unmatched defaults to "confirm". Patterns are Lua
patterns (not regex) per PHASE0.md §3 — no compiled extensions.
Verdict behavior in the interactive CMD: loop:
- allow → run without prompt
- deny → status line, skip
- confirm → [y/N] prompt (same UX as legacy confirm_cmd=true)
Backward compat:
- permissions unset + confirm_cmd=true → always confirm
- permissions unset + confirm_cmd=false → always allow
- permissions set → policy table is authoritative
Scope deliberately limited to the interactive AI-suggested CMD: gate.
Norris autonomous mode keeps its own safety.is_destructive machinery
(combining the two would double-gate or replace the LLM probe — both
non-obvious behavioral changes that belong in their own issues).
User-typed shell-routed lines (`router.classify → "shell"`) and
:exec also bypass the policy by design — those are direct user intent.
New introspection:
:perms list — show the configured rule lists
:perms check <cmd> — report verdict + matching rule (debug)
safety.classify_command is exported and unit-tested with 12 cases
covering each category, priority order (deny > allow on overlap),
and both fallback paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
+31
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
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-- Phase 3: M.is_destructive (static pattern + LLM second-opinion gate for
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-- Norris autonomous mode) and M.norris_step (single-iteration
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-- planning loop). See docs/PHASE2.md §6 and docs/PHASE3.md §4 / §5.
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-- Issue #9: M.classify_command (allow/confirm/deny rule list — interactive
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-- CMD: gate, supersedes the confirm_cmd boolean when configured).
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local rl = require("ffi.readline")
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local json = require("dkjson")
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@@ -10,6 +12,35 @@ local broker = require("broker")
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local M = {}
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-- ---------------------------------------------------------------- classify_command
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-- Walk config.permissions (allow / confirm / deny rule lists) against `cmd`
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-- in priority order: deny > confirm > allow. First match in the chosen
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-- category wins. Returns the verdict string and the matching pattern (for
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-- status messages); falls back to the legacy confirm_cmd boolean when no
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-- permissions table is configured. Default verdict when permissions is set
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-- but no rule matches is "confirm" — per the issue body.
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-- verdict ∈ "allow" | "confirm" | "deny"
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local function _match_any(cmd, rules)
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if not rules then return nil end
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for _, p in ipairs(rules) do
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if cmd:find(p) then return p end
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end
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return nil
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end
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function M.classify_command(cmd, cfg)
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local perms = cfg and cfg.permissions
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if perms then
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local mp = _match_any(cmd, perms.deny); if mp then return "deny", mp end
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mp = _match_any(cmd, perms.confirm); if mp then return "confirm", mp end
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mp = _match_any(cmd, perms.allow); if mp then return "allow", mp end
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return "confirm", nil
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end
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if cfg and cfg.shell and cfg.shell.confirm_cmd then
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return "confirm", nil
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end
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return "allow", nil
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end
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-- Render the call as `name({"path":"/tmp"})` for the confirm prompt.
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-- Truncate to keep one-line prompts.
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local function pretty_call(name, args)
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