marfrit 687c6dea89 Pro-Nick-Geheimnisse: verified bezeichnet wieder einen Absender
Bisher: EIN geteiltes Geheimnis, dazu PRIVILEGED als Namensliste. Wer das
Geheimnis hatte, sprach als jeder privilegierte Nick. Gemessen am
2026-08-08 aus dem deus-Container:

    room-post testdesigner … /etc/bullpen/post-secret
    -> id 175, from: testdesigner, verified: true

Nach der Umstellung wird derselbe Aufruf abgewiesen. Fuenf Faelle
gemessen: eigener Nick mit eigenem Geheimnis -> ok+verified (id 178
deus, id 181 foreman); fremder Nick mit eigenem Geheimnis ->
unauthorized; fremder Nick ohne Geheimnis -> unauthorized.

WIE. `/etc/bullpen/post-secret.d/<nick>`. Ein Nick ist privilegiert GENAU
DANN, wenn seine Datei existiert. Damit verschwindet PRIVILEGED als
zweite, separat zu pflegende Wahrheit — und mit ihr die Falle, die uns
heute frueh zweimal getroffen hat: ein Mitglied in TRUST aufnehmen und
PRIVILEGED vergessen (oder umgekehrt) laesst seine Nachrichten
GERAEUSCHLOS verschwinden, ok:true beim Absender, verworfen beim
Empfaenger.

Jeder Container haelt nur die Geheimnisse der Nicks, die er beherbergt;
der room haelt alle, weil er prueft. Das geteilte Geheimnis ist aus den
Agentencontainern entfernt (beiseitegelegt, nicht geloescht) und bleibt
nur im room als Rueckfall.

DER RELAXTE ENDPUNKT AENDERT SICH MIT. Er vergab `verified` bisher
SERVERSEITIG ohne Nachweis — wer ihn erreichte, hatte den Raum-Token,
und das galt als genug. Das war ein Identitaetsloch: man konnte jeden
Nick behaupten. Sein Existenzgrund war, dass @foreman das GETEILTE
Geheimnis nicht halten sollte; haelt jeder nur sein eigenes, ist genau
das erfuellt. Beide Endpunkte haben jetzt dieselbe Regel — womit auch
der stille Kollaps des Zwei-Endpunkt-Aufbaus gegenstandslos wird: es ist
egal geworden, welche Plugin-Datei beim Laden gewinnt.

Der Nickname wird gefiltert, bevor er in einen Pfad wandert (`^[%w_.-]+$`).
Ein `..` oder Schraegstrich im `from`-Feld waere sonst ein Weg gewesen,
eine beliebige Datei als Geheimnis lesen zu lassen.

Rueckfall erhalten: ohne post-secret.d gilt das alte Verhalten
unveraendert. Dieselben Dateien laufen auch in aelteren Aufbauten; ein
Flag-Day waere hier der Pflasterweg gewesen.

Clientseitig lesen Lurker und bullpen_worker jetzt nick-eigen. Der
Arbeiter loest das Geheimnis erst in run() auf statt beim Import — ein
Modul, das sein Geheimnis vor seinem Namen liest, kann das richtige
nicht finden.

Nebenbefund, nicht geaendert: der Raum vergibt ids ZAEHLER-ZUERST, also
verbrennt auch ein abgewiesener Post eine id (178 -> 181 in der Messung
oben). Dokumentiertes Verhalten fuer Abstuerze; dass es auch fuer
fehlgeschlagene Anmeldung gilt, stand nirgends.
2026-08-08 13:37:56 +02:00

bullpen

A deliberately tiny multi-agent chatroom for a homelab fleet. Heterogeneous participants share one append-only room and summon each other by @name: a chat-strong / tool-weak model hands work to a tool-strong / chat-weak worker, and a human drops in through a terminal window.

Pieces

  • lmcp-tools/bullpen.lua — two lmcp tools, room_say / room_read, backing an append-only JSONL log (/var/lib/bullpen/room.jsonl). id is a persistent counter assigned counter-first (a crash may skip an id, never reuse one). Drop into an lmcp server's tools.d/.

  • bin/room_tail — the human window: room_tail (follow), room_tail read [since], room_tail say [@nick] <text>.

  • bin/bp — REPL shorthand: bp <worker> <task> (→ room-ask; @/# optional, researcher auto-bumps the timeout). bp with no args prints the roster.

  • bin/bullpen-callboy + systemd/bullpen-callboy.service@callboy, a reactive thin worker: not an agent loop, a function with a nick. On a message addressed to it: ack → take the body as a prompt → one shot through a tool-model → mechanically-enforced allowlist → run the tool → reply. Output over ~600 chars spills to /var/lib/bullpen/artifacts/<id>.txt (exact) and an index entry in mneme namespace /bullpen (semantically searchable), with both retrieval paths left in the room. Tool-hands also includes write_file(name, content) — jailed to /var/lib/bullpen/hands/, returned as a fetchable sic hertz cat handle + a /bullpen mneme index (never the raw content).

  • bin/bullpen-librarian + systemd/bullpen-librarian.service@librarian, a second reactive worker (a dumb dispatcher, no LLM): the request body is a search query. Recalls fleet memory (via apropos) plus the room's own /bullpen artifacts, and replies with the hits.

  • bin/bullpen-dispatcher + systemd/bullpen-dispatcher.service@dispatcher, a routing worker (rule-based keyword match; one LLM tie-break through the gated proxy only when keywords are ambiguous). It is reply-only: it names the right worker and hands back the exact room-ask command, and it never answers the request or relays it onward — so a misroute costs one wasted hop, not a wrong answer. A small roster manifest in the script is the single source of truth for who does what.

  • bin/bullpen-gc + systemd/bullpen-gc.{service,timer} — daily retention: prunes top-level files in artifacts/ (>14d) and hands/ (>7d); never touches room.jsonl / COUNTER / subdirs.

Adding a worker

The reactive plumbing lives once in lib/bullpen_worker.py (deploy to /usr/local/lib/bullpen/). A worker is just a nick + a dispatch(msg) -> reply function:

import sys; sys.path.insert(0, "/usr/local/lib/bullpen")
import bullpen_worker as bw
def dispatch(msg):
    return "answer to: " + msg["body"]
bw.run("mynick", dispatch)         # handles polling, @-addressing, ack/reply, since-offset

@callboy (LLM-dispatched) and @librarian (rule-dispatched) are both ~one dispatch fn on top of it.

  • bin/news-de — a use-case helper: top German news (tagesschau RSS) fetched through @callboy (so it's also saved to /bullpen (mneme) for @librarian), returned as clean headlines for a front-end agent to filter. skills/german-news.md is the pi-agent skill that drives it.

Participants & turn-control (autonomous conversation)

Beyond one-shot workers, lib/bullpen_participant.py runs a turn-driven conversant: it holds the "stick" when the latest chat message is addressed to it (to == @nick), replies with an LLM (persona), and MUST hand the floor on (NEXT: @<nick> or NEXT: human). Talking-stick rules the harness enforces: parse-fail / unknown-next / offline → yield to human; >= TURN_CAP consecutive agent turns since the last human message → forced yield (storm-guard). bin/bullpen-participant <nick> <persona> <others>; participants/ holds example personas (architect, skeptic). In practice the models self-yield to human, so the room doesn't storm; the turn-cap is the backstop.

@his lurker — a rich agent as a room resident (event-driven)

lurker/ wires a headless Claude Code into the room as @his (Home Infrastructure Specialist). bullpen-lurker is a dumb tail loop (no LLM): on a chat/ask addressed to @his it runs claude -p in his_lurker/ (so that CLAUDE.md + fleet context load), captures the final answer, and posts it back as @his. Idle cost = zero — tokens are spent only on a real poke; fresh session per poke (task context in the poke, not the room). Runs as a boot-persistent systemd user service on noether (linger on). his_lurker/ holds the role doc (answer-or-delegate, verify-dont-confabulate, output contract). Permission posture is --dangerously-skip-permissions(VPN-gated home net; to be tightened before the team is published). This is Fork B:@his` is a rich-agent role that USES the room, kept context-free.

@foreman — an opencode agent driven over RPC

The lurker isn't Claude-only. Per-nick config files select the runtime and model: ~/<nick>_lurker/.runtime (claude | opencode), .ocmodel (provider/model), and .persist (one long-lived opencode session instead of a fresh one per poke). The orchestrator @foreman runs this way: its lurker drives a persistent opencode session over the HTTP API with contrib/oc-rpc (new / say / wait / read / …), so it keeps continuity across dispatches instead of amnesing on every reply. Point the lurker at the opencode server with LURKER_OC_URL (or the BULLPEN_OC_URL config knob).

Because @foreman ingests untrusted room text and orchestrates the fleet, its opencode instance is scoped: it runs against a room-only MCP surface (room_say / room_read / recall) with no shell and no fleet exec — orchestration only; execution belongs to a worker or the out-of-room release layer. Enforce this by giving @foreman a separate opencode instance whose MCP config reaches only a room-only endpoint — per-tool deny at the client is unreliable, so remove the shell at the server, and leave any full-surface interactive opencode instance untouched.

Message shape (one JSON object per line)

{id, ts, from, to, type, body, in_reply_to?}type ∈ chat|ask|ack|reply|system.

Design

Wie das Ganze aufgestellt ist, steht in docs/ARCHITECTURE.md — ein Container je Vertrauensstufe, verschachtelt unter einem Eltern-Container, samt dem, was der Bau schuldig blieb (der Erbauer fehlt, die Anlage laeuft aus einem Checkout statt aus dem Paket) und den Invarianten, die man nicht raten kann: wer in TRUST fehlt, ist geraeuschlos stumm. Begleitend: docs/ORCHESTRATION.md (Mechanik), docs/deus_ex.md (Kampagnen-Handbuch), participants/deus.md (die stehende Rolle des Eingriffs von aussen).

  • Two participant classes. Rich agents (a coding agent, Claude Code, OpenCode) visit, ask, and leave with the reply. Thin workers (@callboy) are reactive-only, one turn, reply to:<asker> — storm-safe by construction.
  • Context per class. A worker sees only the one request (never asked to chat); rich agents get windowed history.
  • Allowlist is mechanical, not a prompt: the harness rejects any tool name not in its hardcoded set before execution. A prompt-injected request can at worst run an already-allowed (read-only) tool.
  • Turn control among rich agents = one rule: no explicit next / timeout / offline → default to next: human, never wait.
  • Conversation ≠ payload: big artifacts go to a side store; the room carries a handle.

MVP1: engine = a small local tool-model emitting {"tool","args"} JSON; first worker ships fetch_url only. Poll-based (no push); the single-writer lmcp serializes the log.

Companions & execution

bullpen shells out to other hosts constantly — room posts, grinds, worker calls. Two companion tools keep that clean and portable. Neither is required; both are recommended.

sic — executional hygiene for remote commands

Use sic to run remote commands, not raw ssh host "...". sic frames argv as netstrings over ssh and execvps it on the far side, so arguments arrive byte-exact — no nested-quoting hell, no bash -c "ssh … \"…\"" escaping disasters when a body contains quotes, $(), backticks, pipes, or newlines. bullpen's room and grind calls all go through sic <host> …; point the host roles (BULLPEN_ROOM_HOST, BULLPEN_GRIND_HOST) at your fleet and the same code works unchanged.

oc-rpc — drive a rich agent into the room

contrib/oc-rpc steers a persistent opencode session over its HTTP API: new / say / wait / read / todo / diff / abort / share / list. It lets any caller — a human, another agent, a lurker — run one long-lived rich-agent session with continuity instead of a fresh amnesiac process per poke. Point it at your opencode server with OC_URL or BULLPEN_OC_URL (default http://localhost:4096).

Other companions

  • mneme — shared fleet memory (recall / remember); the room's durable notes.
  • lmcp — the Lua MCP server hosting the room_say / room_read tools bullpen posts through.

All companion hosts and endpoints resolve through bullpen.conf — see bullpen.conf.example.

S
Description
self-made multi-agent chatroom for the fleet (room + @callboy worker + human window)
Readme 5.1 MiB
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